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Vulnerable Life by Vulneraman | Cyber Security Blog

[Collection] Powershell Toolkit For PenTester

Original Post: https://securityonline.info/collection-powershell-toolkit-for-pentesterempire-powershellpowermemorypowersploit/

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How To Build And Run A SOC for Incident Response – A Collection Of Resources

How to build a SOC / How to run a SOC

In this resource I’ll locate some great resources for SOC, how to build a SOC, how to set-up a SOC and how to run and maintain your SOC once set up. I will also keep the links and tools up to date as I find new & better resources.

Let me know if you have comments or additions please.

_________

1- Starting Point – Some theoretical content:

What is a SOC? A SOC is a Security operations centre‍, where you have people dedicated to the company’s ongoing information security watching and responding. They need the tools to prevent what they can and discover+remediate what they can not. They need the skills to do this.

Free:

IR process template via Frode Hommedal: http://frodehommedal.no/presentations/first-tc-oslo-2015/#/slide-start

CSIRT process, new one by Frode Hommedal: http://frodehommedal.no/presentations/cert-ee-symposium-2016/#/

Report Template for Threat Intelligence and Incident Response by Lenny Zeltser

MITREhttps://www.mitre.org/sites/default/files/publications/pr-13-1028-mitre-10-strategies-cyber-ops-center.pdf

Building a SOC via twitter user Rafeeq_rehman Building_SOC.pdf

An EY SOC white paperEY-SOC-Oct-2013.pdf

A HP SOC white paper: Building-Maturing-and-Rocking-a-Security-Operations-Center-Brandie-Anderson.pdf

The Grand List of Incident Management Frameworks via Gabor Szathmari

A slidedeck on building a SOC via Slideshare:

Design & Build a Security Operation Center – from Sameer Paradia (CGEIT,CISM,CISSP)

SANS https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/analyst/incident-response-fight-35342

OWASP incident response project https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Incident_Response_Project
via Tom Brennan

RSA conference presentation 2012 Ben RothkeBuilding a Security Operations Center(SOC) 
McAfee – Creating and Maintaining a SOC – The details behind successful security operations centers

emc Creating an intelligence-driven SOC

Peerlyst resource: A list of Incident Response Playbooks by Michael Hamblin

Building a World-Class Security Operations Center:A Roadmap by SANS

How to build and runa SecurityOperations Center by Nicolas Fischbach of Securite

Building and running a SOC with Splunk

Lessons learned from working in a SOC by Jen Andre of Komand

“Build a SOC or Choose an MSSP?” by Eric Carroll

How to build and run a Security Operations Center by Renato Basante Borbolla

Requiring sign-up:

AlienVault https://www.alienvault.com/resource-center/ebook/insider-guide-to-incident-response-download

Dell SecureWorks http://go.secureworks.co.uk/incident-response-preparedness

Paid:

Designing and Building Security Operations Center 1st Edition by David Nathans

Security Operations Center: Building, Operating, and Maintaining your SOC from October 2015 by Joseph Muniz, Gary McIntyre, Nadhem AlFardan

Crafting the InfoSec Playbook. Security Monitoring and Incident Response Master Plan” by Jeff Bollinger, Brandon Enright, Matthew Valites. Thanks Sashank Dara‍ for mentioning this.

2- Some Practical resources for incident response and SOC

Cheat Sheets:

http://www.malwarearchaeology.com/cheat-sheets

Awesome Incident response collection

Training/Certifications:
A critique of the parts/elements of paid incident handling‍ certfications via Taosecurity‍:

http://taosecurity.blogspot.lu/2009/04/speaking-of-incident-response.html

Free:

Computer and hackingforensics on Cybrary.ithttps://www.cybrary.it/course/computer-hacking-forensics-analyst/

Most of Opensecuritytraining http://opensecuritytraining.info/Training.html

Paid:

SANS‍ MGT517: managing Security Operations: Detection, Response, and Intelligencehttps://www.sans.org/course/managing-security-operations-detection-response-and-intelligence

https://www.sans.org/course/continuous-monitoring-security-operations Sec511

EC-Council Certified incident Handler http://www.eccouncil.org/Certification/ec-council-certified-incident-handler

GIAC Certified incident Handler (GCIH) https://www.giac.org/certification/certified-incident-handler-gcih

cert-Certified Computer Security incident Handler https://www.sei.cmu.edu/training/certificates/security/handler.cfm

Incident response and network forensics on Infosecinstitute

SANS SEC504hackertools, techniquesExploits and incident handling

SANS Cyber defensehttps://www.sans.org/curricula

SANS Master degree in Incident response: https://www.sans.edu/academics/certificates/incident-response

3. Tools of the trade:

Open Source/Free:

The list of tools here on postmodernsecurity.com :
https://postmodernsecurity.com/2015/09/11/malware-analysis-and-incident-response-tools-for-the-frugal-and-lazy/

IP TO ASN via Teamcymru. IP To ASN allows one to map IP numbers to BGP prefixes and ASNs. These services come in various flavors, including whois (TCP 43), dns (UDP 53), HTTP (TCP 80) and HTTPS (TCP 443).

TOTALHASH totalhash provides static and dynamic analysis of malware samples. The data available on this site is free for non commercial use. If you have samples that you would like analyzed you may upload them to our anonymous FTP server.

Via InfosecTDK‍ https://www.hybrid-analysis.com An automated malware analysis sandbox

Malwr malwr is a free malware analysis service and community launched in January 2011. You can submit files to it and receive the results of a complete dynamic analysis back.

Via CIRCL.LU:

Twitter user DA_667 storify on questions to ask when hiring an incident responder – storify created by

DA_667 on IR toolset on a shoestring budget using World of warcraft analogies:

SIEMelk stack
NSMSnort + Bro (with fullcap/flow later on when/if I had money)
Client-Side: GRR + El-Jefe + whatever crap A/V solution
Heroic Mode Extra credit: Packet Fence for shunting infected machines into a ?GTFO? VLAN for re-imaging/IR purposes
25-man RAID mode: Moloch for FPC.

Remote IOC scannerhttps://github.com/CERT-Solucom/certitude

Defeating pth attacks via DFIRBLOG

Free service that unpacks, scans and analyzes almost any firmware package, detects vulnerabilitiesbackdoors -> firmware.refirmware.re

usb packet capture/sniffer http://desowin.org/usbpcap/

Javascript deobfuscator toolhttp://www.kahusecurity.com/2015/new-javascript-deobfuscator-tool/

Live Incident response in powershell: PSRecon https://github.com/gfoss/PSRecon

List all named pipes via powershell:

PS C:\> [System.IO.Directory]::GetFiles("\\.\\pipe\\")Securityonion and Sysmon (slides)

Security onion Conference – 2015 from DefensiveDepth

Windows Live Artifact acquisition scripthttps://github.com/OMENScan/AChoir

LAIKA BOSS open sourced by lockheed martin https://github.com/lmco/laikaboss/blob/master/README.md

Via mozilla open sourced: incident investigations: MIG “Mozllla InvestiGator”: github.com/mozilla/mig

88 Feeds, ~800K live streamable threat Intel indicators to your sensors (link) via @critical stack

Incident response hunting tools: https://sroberts.github.io/2015/04/21/hunting-tools/

Share threat information with vetted partners -> ThreatExchange via the Facebook team

Cymon: Cymon is the largest tracker of open-source security reports about phishing, malware, botnets and other maliciousactivities.

NBDServer: Network block Device server for windows with a DFIR/forensic focus via Jeff Bryner

PYIOCpython tools for IOC (Indicator of Compromise) handling via Jeff Bryner

MozDef: The mozilladefense platform – automation of the security incident handling process and facilitate the real-timeactivities of incident handlers. Also via Jeff Bryner (suggested by @sastrytumuluri )

Maltrail: Maltrail is a malicious traffic detection system, utilizing publicly available (black)lists containing malicious and/or generally suspicious trails, along with static trails compiled from various AV reports and custom user defined lists

FIDO by the netflix team for automating incident response.

FIDO is an orchestration layer used to automate the incident response process by evaluating, assessing and responding to malware. Fido?s primary purpose is to handle the heavy manual effort needed to evaluate threats coming from today’s security stack and the large number of alerts generated by them. As an orchestration platform fido can make using your existing security tools more efficient and accurate by heavily reducing the manual effort needed to detect, notify and respond to attacks against a network.

Fast IR Collector by Sekoialab

This tool collects different artefacts on live windows and records the results in csv files. With the analyses of this artefacts, an early compromission can be detected.

Kansa: A powershell incident response framework

Fast Incident Response by cert societe generale

The awesome Incident Response Collection

SCOT:

The Sandia Cyber Omni Tracker (SCOT) is a cyber security incident response management system and knowledge base. Designed by cyber security incident respondersSCOT provides a new approach to manage security alertsanalyze data for deeper patterns, coordinate team efforts, and capture team knowledge. SCOT integrates with existing security applications to provide a consistent, easy to use interface that enhances analyst effectiveness.

LOKI:

Loki – Simple IOC and Incident Response scanner https://www.bsk-consulting.de/loki-free-ioc-scanner/

Volatility & Volatility Autoruns:

Volatility autoruns pluginFinding persistence points (also called ” auto-Start Extensibility Points”, or ASEPs) is a recurring task of any investigation potentially involving malware.To make an analyst’s life a BIT easier, I came up with theautoruns plugin. autoruns basically automates most of the tasks you would need to run when trying to find out where malware is persisting from. Once all the autostart locations are found, they are matched with running processes in memory.

IR_Tool: A simple bash script for digital forensic on linux/unix system

Malcom: Malware Communication Analyzer

Malcom is a tool designed to analyze a system’s network communication using graphical representations of network traffic, and cross-reference them with known malware sources. This comes handy when analyzing how certain malware species try to communicate with the outside world.

YARA – The pattern matching swiss knife

IRTriage – Incident Response Triage – Windows evidence Collection for forensic analysis

Skydive: An Open Source real-time network topology and protocols analyzer

EMET 5.5. Always relevant to use, especially now that it can block Casey Smith’s (SubTee) regsrv32 applocker bypass. Instructions on that here.

reassemble_dns – NICE tool 2 read pcap files, extract DNS messages &write them into file. IP fragments + TCP streams r reassembled

Mandiant‍ Redline‍ (free and open source) https://www.fireeye.com/services/freeware/redline.html

ANZ Nighthawk‍ / NighthawkResponse‍ is a new incident response tool‍ for Mandiant Redlinehttps://github.com/biggiesmallsAG/nightHawkResponse

DNStwistCrazyParser– Identify typosquatting phishing domains

DNS Probe‍ and DNS_analyze‍ -> Identify, capture and analyze DNS traffic. Linkand Link.

Good tool collection by category on dfir.training blog: http://www.dfir.training/index.php/tools/new

OSXCollector which has now been turned into AMIRA: Automated Malware Incident Response & Analysis

Strake-IR‍ from 9yahds is a Security Incident Response Orchestration solution, 2 seat subscription is free.

IRMA Incident Response Malware Analysis. Today’s defense is not only about learning about a file, but it is also getting a fine overview of the incident you dealt with: where / when a malicious file has been seen, who submitted a hash, where a hash has been noticed, which anti-virus detects it. IRMA intends to be an open-source platform designed to help identifying and analyzing malicious files.

New (Nov, 2016): Introducing TheHive: a Scalable, Open Source and Free Incident Response Platform blog.thehive-project.org/2016/11/07/int…

140 free forensics toolshttps://forensiccontrol.com/resources/free-software/

_________

Commercial solutions:

Syncurity IR – Implement a repeatable, scalable, auditable process across your entire security operations and incident response lifecycle.

The Demisto platform – The automation and Collaboration Platform for your security operations center (evaluation of this needed, please let me know if you’ve used this).

Using RiskIQ Inc.‍ Passivetotal‍ for Automated Infrastructure Alerts

Strake-IR‍ from 9yahds is a Security Incident Response Orchestration solution, 2 seat subscription is free. http://9yahds.com/

_________

4. Relevant Blogs/Slides:

Introduction to DFIR https://sroberts.github.io/2016/01/11/introduction-to-dfir-the-beginning

Free reverse engineering tools list https://wiremask.eu/articles/free-reverse-engineering-tools/

(In time this will be completed: https://www.peerlyst.com/blog-post/resource-incident-response-guide)

Incident response must improve! https://www.peerlyst.com/blog-post/security-incident-response-must-improve

Preparing for Incident Response https://www.peerlyst.com/blog-post/incident-response-preparation

Getting Management Buy-in for IR https://blog.peerlyst.com/blog-post/incident-response-management-buyin

Dealing with analyst fatigue https://www.peerlyst.com/blog-post/incident-response-how-do-you-deal-with-analyst-fatigue

The importance of process https://www.peerlyst.com/blog-post/incident-response-the-importance-of-process

Infosecinstitute on SOC: http://resources.infosecinstitute.com/security-operations-center/

10 attributes of a leading SOC https://www.rooksecurity.com/10-attributes-of-a-leading-security-operations-center-soc-in-2014-2/

Automating Forensic Artifact Collection with Splunk and GRR (link)

NoSQL forensics

Report template for threat intelligence and Incident Response (link)

+Added: MS Ignore presentation: Windows Event Forwarding / Centralized logging for everyone via Jessica Payne

How to Manage a Large Volume of Cyber Alerts via securityweek

Extracting a PCAP from memory https://isc.sans.edu/forums/diary/Extracting+pcap+from+memory/20639

Windows commands Abused by attackers http://blog.jpcert.or.jp/2016/01/windows-commands-abused-by-attackers.html

Windows 10 and enhanced powershell logging https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/02/greater_visibilityt.html

From RSAC‍ 2016 by Mark Russinovich:

“Machine Learning and the Cloud: Disrupting Threat Detection and Prevention”

From RSAC‍ 2016 by Mark Russinovich:

“Tracking Hackers on Your Network with Sysinternals Sysmon”

crowdstrike‍ blog: Recon detection by the blue teamhttp://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/reconnaissance-detection-blue-team/

Improving Incident Response Investigations by JP Bourget‍ https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/improving-incident-response-investigations-jp-bourget-1

WMI persistence‍ blog and how to detect this persistence: http://windowsir.blogspot.lu/2016/04/cool-stuff-re-wmi-persistence.html which includes links to Matt Graeers blackhat US 2015 presentation paper on this topic. and and the DellSecureworks blog about their discovery

Basic Snort Rules Syntax and Usage

SubTee SCT persistence module: https://github.com/subTee/SCTPersistence -> useful to know and be able to detect

Hacking exposed: Computer forensics blog by David Cowen. Lots of good forensics advice to be found.

From BsidesCharm: Hunting threat actors with TLS certificates. Using open source data to defend networks by Mark Parsons / @markpars0ns / mark at accessviolation.org

ELF Shared Library Injection Forensics via backtrace.io

Detecting DNS Tunnels with Packetbeat and Watcher

Data observed from monitoring DNS traffic on a network can be used as an indicator of compromise (IOC). This blog post will discuss how elasticsearch and Watcher can be used with Packetbeat to alert when possible malware activity is detected. Packetbeat is our open source packet analyzer.

Not all IOC scanning is the sameScan that which helps you via BSK-Consulting.

Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge by Mitre

Outsourcing the SOC function can make sense. Use cases for managed security services via Securosis‍ thanks Sashank Dara‍ for the link

Diagnosis SOC-atrophy‍ : What To Do When Your Security Operation Center Gets Sick

Proxy server logs for incident response https://www.vanimpe.eu/2016/10/21/proxy-server-logs-incident-response/ via Koen Van‍

Advice on setting up a SOC or multiple SOCs in 1 organizationhttp://www.montance.com/mgt517/#/5/7

Threat hunting for SOCs via Raffael Marty‍:

Original Post: https://www.peerlyst.com/posts/how-to-build-and-run-a-soc-for-incident-response-and-enterprise-defensibility-a-collection-of-resources

Free Online Tools for Looking up Potentially Malicious Websites

Several organizations offer free online tools for looking up a potentially malicious website. Some of these tools provide historical information; others examine the URL in real time to identify threats:

Any on-line tools that should be on this list, but are missing? Let me know. My other lists of on-line security resources outline Automated Malware Analysis Services and Blocklists of Suspected Malicious IPs and URLs.

Best Onion Links – Deep Web

Best Onion Links - Deep Web

 

Introduction Points

  • Ahmia.fi – Clearnet search engine for Tor Hidden Services
  • EasyONIONs – EasyONIONS is the easiest way to access a hidden service
  • The Tor Dark Wiki – Latest links from Tor Dark Wiki
  • The Uncensored Hidden Wiki – This wiki is a community project aimed at collecting and cataloging anything and everything
  • Light Hidden Wiki -Light version of original Hidden Wiki
  • All Your Wiki – Mostly just a mirror of the directories without linking to CP.
  • Tor Directory – 50 000+ Sources.
  • The Hidden Wiki – Wiki style link list of TOR, most links there are SCAMS!
  • OnionList Onion Link List and Vendor Reviews.
  • DuckDuckGo – A Hidden Service that searches the clearnet.
  • Bitcoin Fog – Bitcoin anonymization taken seriously.
  • Torch – Tor Search Engine. Claims to index around 1.1 Million pages.
  • Torlinks – Directory for .onion sites, moderated.
  • Grams – Search Darknet Markets and more.
  • Hidden Wiki – The Hidden Wiki more orderly and updated!
  • The Uncensored Hidden Wiki – A censorship-free mirror of The Hidden Wiki!
  • The Hidden Wiki – A mirror of the Hidden Wiki. 2 days old users can edit the main page.
  • The Liberty Wiki – A 100% community editable wiki that welcomes all users. Allows a variety of uses. Now recruiting Admins. [Back up]
  • Hidden Links – Directory for hidden services, daily verified for availability. Anybody can add new links. [Down 2015/5]
  • Hidden Answers – a site for asking questions and receiving answers on TOR.
  • The Matrix – Very nice to read.
  • How to Exit the Matrix – Learn how to Protect yourself and your rights, online and off.
  • Verifying PGP signatures – A short and simple how-to guide.
  • In Praise Of Hawala – Anonymous informal value transfer system
  • MatrixDirectory -New and Fresh Onion Links Everyday! Nov. 2016. Matrix Directory

 

Financial Services

  • Torads – TorAds is an advertising network for both advertisers and publishers dedicated for use on hidden services behind Tor.
  • EasyCoin – Bitcoin Wallet with free Bitcoin Mixer.
  • WeBuyBitcoins – Sell your Bitcoins for Cash (USD), ACH, WU/MG, LR, PayPal and more.
  • OnionWallet – Anonymous Bitcoin Wallet and Bitcoin Laundry.
  • ccPal – CCs, CVV2s, Ebay, Paypals and more.
  • HQER – High quality euro bills replicas / counterfeits
  • USD Counterfeits – High quality USD counterfeits.
  • The Green Machine! – Forum type marketplace with some of the oldest and most experienced vendors around. Get your paypals, CCs, etc, here!
  • The PaypalCenter – Live Paypal accounts with good balances – buy some, and fix your financial situation for awhile.
  • Premium Cards – Oldest cc vendor, Top quality Us & Eu credit cards!
  • Hack Masters Trust – Risk Free Pre-Paid cards for sale.
  • Unique Opportunities Offering a couple of high quality products for a great deal!
  • Hidden Wallet – Tor Anonymous Hidden Bitcoin Wallet
  • Paypal Baazar – paypal accounts for sale
  • Cash Machine – Phished PayPal, Neteller, Skrill, BoA, Wells fargo bank Accounts, Paysafecard’s, US & EU Credit cards are available here.
  • Shadow Wallet – An Anonymous user Friendly Bitcoin Wallet/Mixer – Highly Regarded Service
  • Card Store – Bank card store, сс, paypal, dump+pin. Free shipiing
  • BitBlender – Bitcoin mixer.
  • Shared Coin – Free, fast and privacy-oriented Darknet Bitcoin Mixer, any amount from 0.0001 to 50 BTC.
  • SOL’s USD Counterfeits – High Quality 20 USD Counterfeit Notes – Trusted Service.
  • The Queen of Cards – #1 Female Carding Forum for CCs, Pre-Paid, WU, MG, Bank & PayPal Transfers, Since 2011!
  • OnionWallet – Anonymous Bitcoin Wallet and Bitcoin Laundry.
  • Wall Street – Paypal accounts, credit cards, we have everything!!
  • Cheap Euros – 20€ Counterfeit bills. Unbeatable prices!!
  • Paypal-Coins – Buy a paypal account and receive the balance in your bitcoin wallet.
  • Bitiply! Multiply Your Bitcoins Through Bitcoin Malleability Exploit!
  • Clone CC Crew – No.1 Trusted onion site for Cloned Credit Card. $2000/$5000 balance available
  • EasyCoin – Bitcoin Wallet with free Bitcoin Mixer.
  • SOL’s Euro Counterfeits – 50€ Counterfeit notes. Quality + Best Prices
  • Double your Bitcoins – Service that doubles your Bitcoins.
  • Credit Cards – Credit Cards, from the most Trusted Vendor in the union.Fast shipping.
  • Your C.Card Shop – Physical credit cards with High balance available to order. Paypal or bitcoins as payment methods
  • Skimmed Cards Oldest seller on old HW. Fresh stock. 99.9% safe. Worldwide cashout! Express shipping.
  • BtcLowen Sell your Bitcoins for 10% more than the market value!
  • 7YearsinTibet Fully automated PayPal & Credit card market site. Fresh stock every 2 days. Best deals.
  • USJUD Counterfeits – EUR || USD Counterfeit money, any trusted escrow accepted, the most trusted seller.
  • Dexters Bank – One-Stop shop for Western Union and Bank Transfers on the Deep Web.Amazing Service. Bitcoins/Litecoins only –
  • AnonCoin – Clean your coins 100% anonymously! For a 0.1% fixed fee.
  • Fake Bills – Fake bills in Euro/dollar. Cheap price, shipping worldwide.
  • Instabit – Get bitcoins instantly
  • Buy and sell Bitcoin Anonymous and safe purchase and sale of bitcoins.
  • TOR Wallet – Bitcoin Wallet with integrated Bitcoin Mixer.

 

 

Commercial Services

 

Domain Services

 

Hosting / Web / File / Image

  • Fuck You Hosting Completely free hosting service for onion websites
  • Prometheus_Hidden_Services – Payed hosting, provides Virtual Private Server (VPS) with Linux
  • Image Hosting – Free image hosting site, anything goes
  • Freedom Hosting II – Anonymous Freehosting with PHP/MySQL Support
  • Free imageboard – apply here for free board on this forum, with basic janitor priveleges
  • Web Hosting — Web Hosting PHP5, MySQL, SFTP Access, .onion Domain. 24 hours free hosting.
  • TorShops – Get your own .onion store with full bitcoin integration.
  • Bittit – Host and sell your original pictures for Bitcoins.
  • Liberty’s Hackers – Service and Hosting Provider in onionland php5/mysql support request considered on a case by case.
  • CYRUSERV – Hosting service with an emphasis on security, open for business again.
  • TorVPS Shells — Free torified shell accounts, can be used for .onion hosting, IRC, etc.

 

 

Blogs / Essays

 

Social Networks

  • BlackBook – Social media site (The facebook of TOR)
  • Galaxy 2 – A revival of the old Galaxy community.
  • Facebook – The real Facebook’s Onion domain. Claim not to keep logs. Trust them at your peril.
  • MultiVerse Social Network – Social Network with anonymous IRC chat services as well as other features.
  • Friendica The friend network

 

Forums / Boards / Chans

  • Torchan – /b/, /i/, programming, revolution, tons of other boards
  • Torduckin0 #1st – Citadel BBS with chat and IM to support Torduckin.
  • InserTor – Tor pastebin clone. Create new paste, share code, share news. Public and Private pastes. Create encrypted paste (encrypted button only with java on) or paste with time limit (also burn on reading!)
  • Wall Street – Paypal accounts, credit cards, we have everything!!
  • Dark Nexus – Deep chat

 

Email / Messaging

  • Sigaint – Darknet email service that allows you to send and receive email without revealing your location or identity.
  • Mail2Tor – New Tor Mail Server to clear web. (Not working properly, delayed emails)
  • AnonMail – Anonymous premium email service like lavabit. (Not free).
  • TorBox – TOR only secure and private email service.
  • Lelantos Free @lelantos.org account.
  • MailTor – Free @mailtor.net account (webmail, smtp, pop3 and imap access).

 

Political Advocacy

 

WikiLeaks

 

Other

 

Audio – Music / Streams

 

Books

 

Drugs

 

Physical Goods

 

Digital GoodsCommercial Links

  • ccPal – CCs, CVV2s, Ebay, Paypals and more

Original Post: https://n0where.net/best-onion-links-deep-web/

How to Create a Virus Using the Assembly Language

The art of virus creation seems to be lost. Let’s not confuse a virus for malware, trojan horses, worms, etc. You can make that garbage in any kiddie scripting language and pat yourself on th…

Source: How to Create a Virus Using the Assembly Language

Ten Process Injection Techniques: A Technical Survey Of Common And Trending Process Injection Techniques

Process Injection

Process injection is a widespread defense evasion technique employed often within malware and fileless adversary tradecraft, and entails running custom code within the address space of another process. Process injection improves stealth, and some techniques also achieve persistence. Although there are numerous process injection techniques, in this blog I present ten techniques seen in the wild that run malware code on behalf of another process. I additionally provide screenshots for many of these techniques to facilitate reverse engineering and malware analysis, assisting detection and defense against these common techniques.

1. CLASSIC DLL INJECTION VIA CREATEREMOTETHREAD AND LOADLIBRARY

This technique is one of the most common techniques used to inject malware into another process. The malware writes the path to its malicious dynamic-link library (DLL) in the virtual address space of another process, and ensures the remote process loads it by creating a remote thread in the target process.

DLL Injection

 

The malware first needs to target a process for injection (e.g. svchost.exe). This is usually done by searching through processes by calling a trio of Application Program Interfaces (APIs): CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, Process32First, and Process32Next. CreateToolhelp32Snapshot is an API used for enumerating heap or module states of a specified process or all processes, and it returns a snapshot. Process32First retrieves information about the first process in the snapshot, and then Process32Next is used in a loop to iterate through them. After finding the target process, the malware gets the handle of the target process by calling OpenProcess.

As shown in Figure 1, the malware calls VirtualAllocEx to have a space to write the path to its DLL. The malware then calls WriteProcessMemory to write the path in the allocated memory. Finally, to have the code executed in another process, the malware calls APIs such as CreateRemoteThread, NtCreateThreadEx, or RtlCreateUserThread. The latter two are undocumented. However, the general idea is to pass the address of LoadLibrary to one of these APIs so that a remote process has to execute the DLL on behalf of the malware.

CreateRemoteThread is tracked and flagged by many security products.  Further, it requires a malicious DLL on disk which could be detected.  Considering that attackers are most commonly injecting code to evade defenses, sophisticated attackers probably will not use this approach. The screenshot below displays a malware named Rebhip performing this technique.

 

rebhip worm

Figure 1: Rebhip worm performing a typical DLL injection
Sha256: 07b8f25e7b536f5b6f686c12d04edc37e11347c8acd5c53f98a174723078c365

 

2. PORTABLE EXECUTABLE INJECTION (PE INJECTION)

Instead of passing the address of the LoadLibrary, malware can copy its malicious code into an existing open process and cause it to execute (either via a small shellcode, or by calling CreateRemoteThread). One advantage of PE injection over the LoadLibrary technique is that the malware does not have to drop a malicious DLL on the disk. Similar to the first technique, the malware allocates memory in a host process (e.g. VirtualAllocEx), and instead of writing a “DLL path” it writes its malicious code by calling WriteProcessMemory. However, the obstacle with this approach is the change of the base address of the copied image. When a malware injects its PE into another process it will have a new base address which is unpredictable, requiring it to dynamically recompute the fixed addresses of its PE. To overcome this, the malware needs to find its relocation table address in the host process, and resolve the absolute addresses of the copied image by looping through its relocation descriptors.

 

process injection

 

This technique is similar to other techniques, such as reflective DLL injection and memory module, since they do not drop any files to the disk. However, memory module and reflective DLL injection approaches are even stealthier. They do not rely on any extra Windows APIs (e.g., CreateRemoteThread or LoadLibrary), because they load and execute themselves in the memory. Reflective DLL injection works by creating a DLL that maps itself into memory when executed, instead of relying on the Window’s loader. Memory Module is similar to Reflective DLL injection except the injector or loader is responsible for mapping the target DLL into memory instead of the DLL mapping itself. In a previous blog post, these two in memory approaches were discussed extensively.

When analyzing PE injection, it is very common to see loops (usually two “for” loops, one nested in the other), before a call to CreateRemoteThread.  This technique is quite popular among crypters (softwares that encrypt and obfuscate malware). In Figure 2, the sample unit test is taking advantage of this technique. The code has two nested loops to adjust its relocation table that can be seen before the calls to WriteProcessMemory and CreateRemoteThread. The “and 0x0fff” instruction is also another good indicator, showing that the first 12 bits are used to get the offset into the virtual address of the containing relocation block. Now that the malware has recomputed all the necessary addresses, all it needs to do is pass its starting address to CreateRemoteThread and have it executed.

 

unit test

Figure 2: Example structure of the loops for PE injection prior to calls to CreateRemoteThread
Sha256: ce8d7590182db2e51372a4a04d6a0927a65b2640739f9ec01cfd6c143b1110da

3. PROCESS HOLLOWING (A.K.A PROCESS REPLACEMENT AND RUNPE)

Instead of injecting code into a host program (e.g., DLL injection), malware can perform a technique known as process hollowing. Process hollowing occurs when a malware unmaps (hollows out) the legitimate code from memory of the target process, and overwrites the memory space of the target process (e.g., svchost.exe) with a malicious executable.

process hallowing

 

The malware first creates a new process to host the malicious code in suspended mode. As shown in Figure 3, this is done by calling CreateProcess and setting the Process Creation Flag to CREATE_SUSPENDED (0x00000004). The primary thread of the new process is created in a suspended state, and does not run until the ResumeThread function is called. Next, the malware needs to swap out the contents of the legitimate file with its malicious payload. This is done by unmapping the memory of the target process by calling either ZwUnmapViewOfSection or NtUnmapViewOfSection. These two APIs basically release all memory pointed to by a section. Now that the memory is unmapped, the loader performs VirtualAllocEx to allocate new memory for the malware, and uses WriteProcessMemory to write each of the malware’s sections to the target process space. The malware calls SetThreadContext to point the entrypoint to a new code section that it has written. At the end, the malware resumes the suspended thread by calling ResumeThread to take the process out of suspended state.

 

process hollowing

Figure 3: Ransom.Cryak performing process hollowing
Sha256: eae72d803bf67df22526f50fc7ab84d838efb2865c27aef1a61592b1c520d144

4. THREAD EXECUTION HIJACKING (A.K.A SUSPEND, INJECT, AND RESUME (SIR))

This technique has some similarities to the process hollowing technique previously discussed. In thread execution hijacking, malware targets an existing thread of a process and avoids any noisy process or thread creations operations. Therefore, during analysis you will probably see calls to CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Thread32First followed by OpenThread.

thread execution

 

After getting a handle to the target thread, the malware puts the thread into suspended mode by calling SuspendThread to perform its injection. The malware calls VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory to allocate memory and perform the code injection. The code can contain shellcode, the path to the malicious DLL, and the address of LoadLibrary.

Figure 4 illustrates a generic trojan using this technique. In order to hijack the execution of the thread, the malware modifies the EIP register (a register that contains the address of the next instruction) of the targeted thread by calling SetThreadContext. Afterwards, malware resumes the thread to execute the shellcode that it has written to the host process. From the attacker’s perspective, the SIR approach can be problematic because suspending and resuming a thread in the middle of a system call can cause the system to crash. To avoid this, a more sophisticated malware would resume and retry later if the EIP register is within the range of NTDLL.dll.

generic trojan

Figure 4: A generic trojan is performing thread execution hijacking
Sha256: 787cbc8a6d1bc58ea169e51e1ad029a637f22560660cc129ab8a099a745bd50e

5. HOOK INJECTION VIA SETWINDOWSHOOKEX

Hooking is a technique used to intercept function calls. Malware can leverage hooking functionality to have their malicious DLL loaded upon an event getting triggered in a specific thread. This is usually done by calling SetWindowsHookEx to install a hook routine into the hook chain. The SetWindowsHookEx function takes four arguments. The first argument is the type of event. The events reflect the range of hook types, and vary from pressing keys on the keyboard (WH_KEYBOARD) to inputs to the mouse (WH_MOUSE), CBT, etc. The second argument is a pointer to the function the malware wants to invoke upon the event execution.The third argument is a module that contains the function. Thus, it is very common to see calls to LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress before calling SetWindowsHookEx. The last argument to this function is the thread with which the hook procedure is to be associated. If this value is set to zero all threads perform the action when the event is triggered. However, malware usually targets one thread for less noise, thus it is also possible to see calls CreateToolhelp32Snapshot and Thread32Next before SetWindowsHookEx to find and target a single thread. Once the DLL is injected, the malware executes its malicious code on behalf of the process that its threadId was passed to SetWindowsHookEx function. In Figure 5, Locky Ransomware implements this technique.

locky hook

Figure 5: Locky Ransomware using hook injection
Sha256: 5d6ddb8458ee5ab99f3e7d9a21490ff4e5bc9808e18b9e20b6dc2c5b27927ba1

6. INJECTION AND PERSISTENCE VIA REGISTRY MODIFICATION (E.G. APPINIT_DLLS, APPCERTDLLS, IFEO)

Appinit_DLL, AppCertDlls, and IFEO (Image File Execution Options) are all registry keys that malware uses for both injection and persistence. The entries are located at the following locations:

HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls
HKLM\Software\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\Appinit_Dlls
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\AppCertDlls
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\currentversion\image file execution options

AppInit_DLLs
Malware can insert the location of their malicious library under the Appinit_Dlls registry key to have another process load their library. Every library under this registry key is loaded into every process that loads User32.dll. User32.dll is a very common library used for storing graphical elements such as dialog boxes. Thus, when a malware modifies this subkey, the majority of processes will load the malicious library. Figure 6 demonstrates the trojan Ginwui relying on this approach for injection and persistence. It simply opens the Appinit_Dlls registry key by calling RegCreateKeyEx, and modifies its values by calling RegSetValueEx.

 

appint dll injection

Figure 6: Ginwui modifying the AppIniti_DLLs registry key
Sha256: 9f10ec2786a10971eddc919a5e87a927c652e1655ddbbae72d376856d30fa27c

 

AppCertDlls
This approach is very similar to the AppInit_DLLs approach, except that DLLs under this registry key are loaded into every process that calls the Win32 API functions CreateProcess, CreateProcessAsUser, CreateProcessWithLogonW, CreateProcessWithTokenW, and WinExec.

 

Image File Execution Options (IFEO)
IFEO is typically used for debugging purposes. Developers can set the “Debugger Value” under this registry key to attach a program to another executable for debugging. Therefore, whenever the executable is launched the program that is attached to it will be launched. To use this feature you can simply give the path to the debugger, and attach it to the executable that you want to analyze. Malware can modify this registry key to inject itself into the target executable. In Figure 7, Diztakun trojan implements this technique by modifying the debugger value of Task Manager.

 

dizkatun trojan

Figure 7: Diztakun trojan modifying IFEO registry key
Sha256: f0089056fc6a314713077273c5910f878813fa750f801dfca4ae7e9d7578a148

7. APC INJECTION AND ATOMBOMBING

Malware can take advantage of Asynchronous Procedure Calls (APC) to force another thread to execute their custom code by attaching it to the APC Queue of the target thread. Each thread has a queue of APCs which are waiting for execution upon the target thread entering alterable state. A thread enters an alertable state if it calls SleepEx, SignalObjectAndWait, MsgWaitForMultipleObjectsEx, WaitForMultipleObjectsEx, or WaitForSingleObjectEx functions. The malware usually looks for any thread that is in an alterable state, and then calls OpenThread and QueueUserAPC to queue an APC to a thread. QueueUserAPC takes three arguments: 1) a handle to the target thread; 2) a pointer to the function that the malware wants to run; 3) and the parameter that is passed to the function pointer. In Figure 8, Amanahe malware first calls OpenThread to acquire a handle of another thread, and then calls QueueUserAPC with LoadLibraryA as the function pointer to inject its malicious DLL into another thread.

AtomBombing is a technique that was first introduced by enSilo research, and then used in Dridex V4. As we discussed in detail in a previous post, the technique also relies on APC injection. However, it uses atom tables for writing into memory of another process.

 

alamanahe apc injection

Figure 8: Almanahe performing APC injection
Sha256: f74399cc0be275376dad23151e3d0c2e2a1c966e6db6a695a05ec1a30551c0ad

8. EXTRA WINDOW MEMORY INJECTION (EWMI) VIA SETWINDOWLONG

EWMI relies on injecting into Explorer tray window’s extra window memory, and has been used a few times among malware families such as Gapz and PowerLoader. When registering a window class, an application can specify a number of additional bytes of memory, called extra window memory (EWM). However, there is not much room in EWM. To circumvent this limitation, the malware writes code into a shared section of explorer.exe, and uses SetWindowLong and SendNotifyMessage to have a function pointer to point to the shellcode, and then execute it.

The malware has two options when it comes to writing into a shared section. It can either create a shared section and have it mapped both to itself and to another process (e.g., explorer.exe), or it can simply open a shared section that already exists. The former has the overhead of allocating heap space and calling NTMapViewOfSection in addition to a few other API calls, so the latter approach is used more often. After malware writes its shellcode in a shared section, it uses GetWindowLong and SetWindowLong to access and modify the extra window memory of “Shell_TrayWnd”. GetWindowLong is an API used to retrieve the 32-bit value at the specified offset into the extra window memory of a window class object, and SetWindowLong is used to change values at the specified offset. By doing this, the malware can simply change the offset of a function pointer in the window class, and point it to the shellcode written to the shared section.

Like most other techniques mentioned above, the malware needs to trigger the code that it has written. In previously discussed techniques, malware achieved this by calling APIs such as CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, or SetThreadContext. With this approach, the malware instead triggers the injected code by calling SendNotifyMessage. Upon execution of SendNotifyMessage, Shell_TrayWnd receives and transfers control to the address pointed to by the value previously set by SetWindowLong. In Figure 9, a malware named PowerLoader uses this technique.

 

get window long

 

powerloader

Figure 9: PowerLoader injecting into extra window memory of shell tray window
Sha256: 5e56a3c4d4c304ee6278df0b32afb62bd0dd01e2a9894ad007f4cc5f873ab5cf

 

9. INJECTION USING SHIMS

Microsoft provides Shims to developers mainly for backward compatibility. Shims allow developers to apply fixes to their programs without the need of rewriting code. By leveraging shims, developers can tell the operating system how to handle their application. Shims are essentially a way of hooking into APIs and targeting specific executables. Malware can take advantage of shims to target an executable for both persistence and injection. Windows runs the Shim Engine when it loads a binary to check for shimming databases in order to apply the appropriate fixes.

There are many fixes that can be applied, but malware’s favorites are the ones that are somewhat security related (e.g., DisableNX, DisableSEH, InjectDLL, etc). To install a shimming database, malware can deploy various approaches. For example, one common approach is to simply execute sdbinst.exe, and point it to the malicious sdb file. In Figure 10, an adware,  “Search Protect by Conduit”,  uses a shim for persistence and injection. It performs an “InjectDLL” shim into Google Chrome to load vc32loader.dll. There are a few existing tools for analyzing sdb files, but for the analysis of the sdb listed below, I used python-sdb.

 

shim DLL

Figure10: SDB used by Search Protect for injection purposes
Sha256: 6d5048baf2c3bba85adc9ac5ffd96b21c9a27d76003c4aa657157978d7437a20

10. IAT HOOKING AND INLINE HOOKING (A.K.A USERLAND ROOTKITS)

IAT hooking and inline hooking are generally known as userland rootkits. IAT hooking is a technique that malware uses to change the import address table. When a legitimate application calls an API located in a DLL, the replaced function is executed instead of the original one. In contrast, with inline hooking, malware modifies the API function itself. In Figure 11, the malware FinFisher, performs IAT hooking by modifying where the CreateWindowEx points.

 

Figure 11: FinFisher performing IAT hooking by changing where CreateWindowEx points to
Sha256: f827c92fbe832db3f09f47fe0dcaafd89b40c7064ab90833a1f418f2d1e75e8e

CONCLUSION

In this post, I covered ten different techniques that malware uses to hide its activity in another process. In general, malware either directly injects its shellcode into another process or it forces another process to load its malicious library. In Table 1, I have classified the various techniques and provided samples to serve as a reference for observing each injection technique covered in this post. The figures included throughout the post will help the researcher recognize the various techniques when reversing malware.

process injection techniques

Table1: Process injection can be done by directly injecting code into another process, or by forcing a DLL to be loaded into another process

Attackers and researchers regularly discover new techniques to achieve injection and provide stealth. This post detailed ten common and emerging techniques, but there are others, such as COM hijacking. Defenders will never be “done” in their mission to detect and prevent stealthy process injection because adversaries will never stop innovating.

At Endgame, we constantly research advanced stealth techniques and bring protections into our product. We layer capabilities which detect malicious DLLs that load on some persistence (like AppInit DLLs, COM Hijacks, and more), prevent many forms of code injection in real-time via our patented shellcode injection protection, and detect malicious injected payloads running in memory delivered through any of the above techniques through our patent-pending fileless attack detection techniques. This approach allows our platform to be more effective than any other product on the market in protecting against code injection, while also maximizing resiliency against bypass due to emerging code injection techniques.

Original Post: https://www.endgame.com/blog/technical-blog/ten-process-injection-techniques-technical-survey-common-and-trending-process

Apk Downloader from CNET.com containing malware

Apk Downloader from CNET

http://download.cnet.com/archive/3000-20432_4-15802255.html 

2017_07_16_14_41_21_Apk_Downloader_Free_download_and_software_reviews_CNET_Download.com

The publisher as below:

2017_07_16_14_42_03_Apk_Downloader_Free_download_and_software_reviews_CNET_Download.com

After you download, unzip and execute the Apk Downloader, apkserver.exe will be created in c:\windows\

VirusTotal result:

2017_07_16_14_49_48_Antivirus_scan_for_869e36efd53483bef92cf5671a406d290d65bce63be63be390270f20e677e

Payload Security result:

2017_07_16_14_53_40_Free_Automated_Malware_Analysis_Service_powered_by_VxStream_Sandbox_Viewing_

Anlyz result:

2017_07_16_14_54_47_anlyz_REM

Reported to CNET just now, waiting for there reply. Will keep you guy update.

Basic Malware Analysis Tools

In the upcoming 6 hacking tutorials we will be talking about basic malware analysis and we will start with discussing the many different Basic Malware Analysis Tools which are available. A Malware Analyst is someone highly skilled in reverse engineering malware to get a deep understanding about what a certain piece of malware does and how it does it. To become a malware analyst it is important to have a good understanding of operating systems, software, networking, programming in general, malware in general and assembly language. Assembly language is the low level programming code between the high level programming code and the machine instructions. In other words: it translates the high level language into machine instructions which will be processed by your computers hardware.

 

In this tutorial we will be looking at simple but popular tools for basic static malware analysis like: PEiD to detect packers, Dependency Walker to view dynamically linked functions, Resource Hacker to view the malware’s resources and PEview and FileAlyzer to examine the PE file headers and sections. These tools are used for basic static malware analysis to try to determine the kind of malware and it’s function without actually running the malware. Running and analysing the malware will be covered in laters tutorials. After this we will be looking at the malware analysis advanced tools available for advanced static analysis and advanced dynamic malware analysis in the next article: Dynamic Malware Analysis Tools. Note that we will be discussing the tools in general first and get into detailed tutorials later. In the upcoming tutorials we will be using them on sample malware in detailed step-by-step hacking tutorials.

For now the Malware Analysis Tutorials will be divided in 6 subjects and will be released the upcoming few weeks:

  1. Basic Malware Analysis Tools
  2. Dynamic Malware Analysis Tools
  3. Malware Types Explained
  4. Basic Malware Analysis
  5. Advanced Static Malware Analysis
  6. Advanced Dynamic Malware Analysis

Basic Malware Analysis Tools

As promised we’ll be looking at the following basic malware analysis tool: PEiD, Dependency Walker, Resource Hacker, PEview and FileAlyzer. For your convenience we will supply a download link for the tools as well so you can get your malware analysis toolbox ready for the upcoming tutorials. Be sure to subscribe to our newsletter as we will be updating this list and our toolbox along the upcoming tutorials.

PEiD

Basic Malware Analysis Tools - PEiD

PEiD is a small application which is used to detect common packers, cryptors and compilers. Malware writers often attempt to pack or obfuscate their malware to make it harder to detect and to analyse. The current version of PEiD can detect over 470 different signatures in PE files which are loaded from a txt file called userdb. The official PEiD website is not active anymore but you can download PEiD-0.95-20081103 from Hacking Tutorials using the following download link: PEiD-0.95-20081103.zip (7946 downloads)

You need to replace the userdb.txt file with the following file to add the signatures; PEiD Userdb (6807 downloads)

Dependency Walker

Basic Malware Analysis Tools - Dependency Walker

Another great basic malware analysis tool is Dependency Walker. Dependency Walter is a free application which can be used to scan 32 and 64 bit Windows modules (.exe, .dll, .ocx, etc.) and is used to list all the imported and exported functions of a module. Dependency Walker also displays the dependencies of the file which will result in a minimum set of required files. Depency Walker also displays detailed information about those files including the filepath, version number, machine type, debug information etc.

Dependency Walker can be downloaded here.

Resource Hacker

Basic Malware Analysis Tools - Resource Hacker

Resource Hacker, or sometimes called ResHackers, is a free application used to extract resources from Windows binaries. Resource Hacker can extract, add and modify most resources like strings, images, menus, dialogs, VersionInfo, Manifest resources etc. The latest version of Resource Hacker, which is version 4.2.4, was release in July 2015.

Resource Hacker can be downloaded using the following link: Resource Hacker

PEview

Basic Malware Analysis Tools - PEview

PEview is a free and easy to use application to browse through the information stored in Portable Executable (PE) file headers and the different sections of the file. In the following tutorials we will be learning how to read those headers when we’re examining real malware.

PEview can be downloaded using the following link: PEview.

FileAlyzer

Basic Malware Analysis Tools - FileAlyzer

FileAlyzer is also a free tool to read information stored in PE file headers and sections but offers slightly more features and functionality than PEview. Nice features are the VirusTotal tab which can be used to submit malware to VirusTotal for analysis and the functionality to unpack UPX and PECompact packed files. And yes, Filealyzer is a typo but the developer decided to stick with the name which is kinda cool in our opinion.

FileAlyzer can be downloaded using the following link: FileAlyzer.

More Basic Malware Analysis Tools

Needless to say is that we’ve covered only  a very small portion of the Basic Malware Analysis Tools available. In the upcoming few days we will be adding more tools for you to download and explore so be sure to subscribe to Hacking Tutorials to stay informed about updates. If you have any questions regarding the tools we encourage you to ask them here. Also let us know when you have suggestions for other tools. You can do so by replying to this post.

Thanks for reading and see you in the next chapter: Dynamic Malware Analysis Tools

Original Post: http://www.hackingtutorials.org/malware-analysis-tutorials/basic-malware-analysis-tools/

Gartner Top Technologies for Information Security 2017 vs 2016

Gartner Top Technologies 2017 vs 2016

Gartner Identifies the Top Technologies for Security in 2017

http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3744917

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